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SUPPORTING MARKET INTEGRITY 
 
Harry McVea 
“An integrated and efficient financial market requires market integrity. 
The smooth functioning of securities markets and public confidence in 
markets are prerequisites for economic growth and wealth. Market 
abuse harms the integrity of financial markets and public confidence in 
securities and derivatives.” (Directive 2003/6/EC (Recital 2)). x 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Concerns about the integrity of financial markets are as old as financial 
markets themselves. Practices such as market manipulation, perpetrated 
through the spread of false rumours, were widely reported in and around 
the time of the South Sea Bubble1 – as, indeed, was the practice of insider 
dealing.2 More recently, events surrounding the worst financial crisis since 
the Wall Street Crash have, if anything, served to intensify interest in and 
scrutiny of the integrity of financial market activity.3 Allegations of the 
                                                          
1 See R Dale, The First Crash: Lessons from the South Sea Bubble (Princeton University Press, 
2004) 17–19, and sources cited therein.  
2 See, for example, J Narron and D Skeie, “Crisis Chronicles: The South Sea Bubble of 
1720—Repackaging Debt and the Current Reach for Yield” 
(http://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2013/11/crisis-chronicles-the-south-
sea-bubble-of-1720repackaging-debt-and-the-current-reach-for-yield.html) (noting the 
conduct of Sword Blade Bank in events predating the “bubble”). 
3 “Market integrity” is defined by the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO), as “the extent to which a market operates in a manner that is, 
and is perceived to be, fair and orderly and where effective rules are in place and 
enforced by regulators so that confidence and participation in the market is fostered”: 
Regulatory Issues Raised by the Impact of Technological Changes on Market Integrity and 
Efficiency (Final Report of the Technical Committee of IOSCO, October 2011, available 
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opportunistic shorting of stock in the immediate aftermath of the crisis,4 
claims of hedge fund involvement in insider dealing,5 ongoing concerns 
about the manipulation of benchmarks,6 and mounting fears over the use of 
certain High Frequency Trading (HFT) strategies,7 all underscore the acute 
sensitivity of both market and public opinion to practices which call into 
question the integrity of financial market transactions.  
At its broadest, this chapter seeks to chart major shifts – both academic and 
regulatory – in relation to on-going debates about the need for measures 
which seek to protect the integrity of our financial markets. Although the 
discussion is designed to be global in its reach, the material discussed draws 
primarily on developments in the EU and US – and to a lesser extent the 
UK – and focuses on market integrity issues associated with insider dealing 
and market manipulation (collectively hereinafter, “market abuse”).  
It is suggested, that the picture which emerges from this survey is as 
following: first, that the evolving nature of financial markets – in 
particular, the growing complexity and fragmentation of markets as a 
result of the proliferation of trading across different venues and 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
at: http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD361.pdf)) (9) (hereinafter 
IOSCO, Regulatory Issues (2011)). 
4 See below n 17 and accompanying text. 
5 For a review of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) efforts in the US, see, 
L Thomsen, D Hawke, and P Calande, “Hedge Funds: An Enforcement Perspective” 
(2008) 39 Rutgers LJ 541, 577–593. For similar concerns in the UK pre-crisis, see,  FSA, 
Hedge Funds:  A Discussion of Risk and Regulatory Engagement (Discussion Paper 05/04) 53; 




6 See generally FSA, Annual Report 2012/13. 
7 IOSCO, Addendum to IOSCO Report on Investigating and Prosecuting Market Manipulation 
(April 2013) 1 (available at: 
http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD411.pdf. See also, IOSCO, 
Regulatory Issues (2011) above  n 3, 48. 
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developments associated with HFT strategies8 – has made it more difficult 
for regulators to monitor for possible cases of market abuse. Furthermore, 
these developments have not only increased the risk that new variants of 
market manipulation will emerge, but have afforded opportunities for the 
use of abusive practices on a scale not previously possible. 
Secondly, although the academic debate with regard to the merits or 
otherwise of one prominent form of market abuse – insider dealing – 
remains as alive as ever, there are signs of a shift in the nature of this 
debate, away from earlier exchanges rooted in clashes between competing 
theoretical viewpoints, towards one which today focuses on an empirical 
analysis of the effects of regulation and its enforcement. 
Thirdly, from a policy-making/regulatory perspective, there are clear signs 
of an evolving regulatory landscape characterised by expansionist 
tendencies. This reflects a shift away from the need to justify why market 
abuse should be regulated under law, towards an emphasis on identifying 
where, in the wake of changing market structures and the emergence of 
new strains of market abuse, the appropriate boundaries of market abuse 
offences ought to lie. Reform of the EU’s market abuse regime offers an 
ideal vantage point from which to review this shift. What is more, a 
discussion of the position within the EU – at least from the perspective of 
the regulation of insider dealing – offers an interesting and important 
counterpoint to the increasingly anomalous approach adopted in the US.  
                                                          
8 HFT is strongly associated with algorithmic trading, in that it is a highly quantitative. 
However, speed of execution and a high daily portfolio turnover and high order to trade 
ratio (ie a large number of orders are cancelled in comparison to trades executed) are 
regarded as key characteristics distinguishing it from other forms of algorithmic trading. 
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Finally – and to some extent resonating with EU reforms in relation to 
enforcement concerns – there is evidence of global trend towards more 
active enforcement of market abuse, spearheaded in the main by 
developments in the US and the UK, most significantly in relation to the 
use of criminal sanctions as a deterrent for insider dealing.  
In presenting and developing these ideas, the structure of the chapter is as 
follows. In section II, I set the scene by identifying the types of 
conduct/activity which gives rise to market integrity concerns, following 
which I discuss the likely incidence of market abuse in modern financial 
markets. In Section III, I assess the claimed rationales for prohibitions on 
market abuse and present and, subsequently, critique new empirical 
research which – in the context of insider dealing at any rate – claims to 
support prohibitions on efficiency grounds. In section IV, I survey the 
evolving regulatory landscape. Although the focus here is on the EU’s 
market abuse regime and recent attempts to remodel its contours, I 
contrast aspects of the EU’ evolving regime with developments in the US – 
principally, in relation to the regulation of insider dealing. In section V, I 
focus on enforcement issues, and, finally, in section IV, I draw out key 
stands of the discussion and present my conclusions. 
 
II.    CONDUCT WHICH RAISES MARKET INTEGRITY CONCERNS AND 
THE  INCIDENCE OF MARKET ABUSE  
 
 Conduct Which Raises Market Integrity Concerns 
Activity which gives rise to market integrity concerns encompasses a wide 
spectrum of conduct ranging from “classic” insider dealing (ie dealing on 
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inside information – as well as encouraging others to deal, or disclosing 
inside information to others)9 to various forms of market manipulation. 
These manipulations themselves cover a wide spread of activities,10 such as 
the use of false statements designed to “move” the market in a particular 
direction (so-called “pump and dump” schemes), and the deployment of 
“artificial” devices devoid of any “substantive economic purpose”11 and 
designed merely to create a false impression of market activity.12 Such 
devices include “wash trades”;13 “improper matched orders”;14 “pools”;15 
and so-called “painting the tape”.16 The underlying aim of all these schemes 
is to generate profits or avoid losses by inducing investors to purchase 
securities which subsequently turn out to have little – or no – marketability 
or value. 
                                                          
9 From a regulatory perspective, this involves trading in the relevant securities in public 
markets.  
10 Commentators often distingish between transaction based manipulations (such as 
transactions involving ficititious devices) and information based manipulations (such as 
disseminating false or misleading information). See, eg, G Ferrarini, The European Market 
Abuse Directive (2004) 41 Common Market Law Review, 724– 28; and  
11 D Donald, “Regulating Market Manipulation through an Understanding of Price 
Creation” (2011) 6 NTU L Rev 55, 68.  
12 See, Palmer’s Company Law (Sweet & Maxwell: Looseleaf) para 11.146; D Fischel and 
D Ross, “Should the Law Prohibit ‘Manipulation’ in Financial Markets?” (1991) 105 
Harvard Law Review 503, 504; FCA Handbook, Market Conduct (MAR 1.6.2E); and 
Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR), Market Abuse Directive: Level 3 - 
first set of CESR guidance and information on the common operation of the Directive (CESR/04-
505b) (http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/04_505b.pdf) (hereinafter, CESR 
Guidance). 
13 Where there is no change in the beneficial ownership of the underlying securities 
other than between the parties acting in concert. 
14 Where matching buy and sell orders are entered into simultaneously by colluding 
parties. 
15 Where groups of investors trade amongst themselves in order to suggest an active 
market in the underlying financial instruments. 
16 Where colluding parties entering into a series of transactions  shown on a public 
display facility. 
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Other manipulations include the misuse of market power by way of so-
called “corners” (which involve, first, building up and, subsequently, 
manipulating a controlling or dominant market position),17 or “abusive 
squeezes” where a person with significant influence over the supply of a 
security restricts its liquidity in order to create a price “spike”.18  
More recently, in the wake of the financial crisis, regulators saw fit to 
intervene to prohibit – by way of temporary measures – what was widely 
viewed as abusive short selling in vulnerable financial institutions. Both the 
SEC, in the US, and the now-defunct FSA, in the UK, were at the 
forefront of orchestrating these temporary bans. Broadly, the measures 
prohibited the active creation or increase of net short positions in the 
securities of vulnerable financial sector companies and required market 
disclosure of significant short positions in these securities.19 Following 
these interventions, regulators were again forced to take action against 
leading financial institutions in relation to the manipulation of the London 
Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR),20 and, in recent months, allegations 
                                                          
17 MAR 1.6.4E(1). 
18 MAR 1.6.4E(4); CESR Guidance, above n 12, 12; and P Wood, Law and Practice of 
International Finance (Sweet & Maxwell, 2008, University Edition) paras 24-04 –24-12. 
19 See generally, FSA, Short Selling (DP 09/1) and J Payne, “the Regulation of Short 
Selling and its Reform in Europe”  (2012) 13 European Business Organization Law Review 
413. 
20 See generally, The Wheatley Review of Libor: Final Report (September, 2012) 
(https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/1
91762/wheatley_review_libor_finalreport_280912.pdf). Notwithstanding the 
importance of LIBOR, the benchmarks upon which it is based did not fall directly within 
either the EU’s or the UK’s market abuse regimes. Forthcoming reforms to the EU 
regime – see Section IV below – will remedy this deficiency. For recent reforms in the 
UK, see Financial Services Act 2012, s 91(which makes the manipulation of financial 
benchmarks a criminal offence). The LIBOR scandal underscores the need for concepts 
of market abuse which are “sufficiently flexible to meet the challenges of new 
technologies for communication and trading”. Palmer’s Company Law, above n 12, para 
11.146. 
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have also surfaced of similar manipulation in relation to the Euro Inter-
Bank Offered Rate (EURIBOR).21  
Unsurprisingly, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, a renewed emphasis 
on market integrity has also become evident at the global level. In its 
November 2010 Seoul Communiqué, the G20 leaders tasked the 
International Organisation of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) with 
developing recommendations to promote market integrity, especially in 
the context of “risks posed to the financial system by … technological 
developments.”22 According to IOSCO, although traditional forms of 
market manipulation remain a ongoing feature of financial markets, the 
evolving nature of these markets – in particular, the increasing range of 
venues on which financial products are traded in tandem with the growth 
of HFT strategies (which are highly quantitative and focus on speed of 
execution, high daily portfolio turnover, and a high order to trade ratio) – 
poses significant challenges for regulatory authorities.23 Abuses which have 
become a particular focus of attention in the context of HFT strategies 
include:24 
“Momentum ignition” – where a series of orders and trades are 
initiated in an attempt to set trends and foster rapid price 
movements;  
                                                          
21 “JPMorgan, “HSBC and Credit Agricole accused of euro rate-fixes” 
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-27482358 (20 May 2014)). 
22 The G20 Seoul Summit Declaration, 11-12 November 2010, available at 
http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul-doc.pdf.]. 
23 Above n 7. 
24 See, eg, IOSCO, Regulatory Issues, above n 3, 30; and the European Securities and 
Markets Authority (ESMA), Guidelines: Systems and Controls in an Automated Trading 
Environment for Trading Platforms, Investment Firms and Competent Authorities (24 February 
2012, ESMA/2012/122 (EN)) 
(www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/esma_2012_122_en.pdf) (16-17) (hereinafter, 
ESMA Guidelines). 
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“Quote-stuffing” – where markets are flooded with an excessive 
number of orders which traders place, and then subsequently 
cancel, to cause uncertainty in the market; 
“Spoofing” – where bids or offers are made with the intention that 
they will be cancelled in advance of execution; 
“Layering” – where a trader enters several orders (which are 
subsequently cancelled) with the underlying aim of improving the 
price of a trade in the opposite direction; and 
“Marking the close” or “banging the close” – where trading activity 
takes place either before or during the close of trading with the aim 
of impacting on settlement prices. 
Although such practices are not new, in combination with the proliferation 
and fragmentation of the markets on which financial instruments are today 
traded, opportunities for abuse now exist on a scale not previously 
possible.25  
Estimating the Incidence of Market Abuse 
Given the illegal and secretive nature of market abuses, it is has proved 
difficult to ascertain the degree to which market abuse occurs in practice.26  
With regard to insider dealing, in view of the potential for individual 
financial gain, the difficulties associated with regulatory detection, and, at 
least historically, the relatively remote likelihood of sanctions (even where 
                                                          
25 According to the IOSCO, HFT more than doubled to as much as 56% of US equity 
trading in the period from 2005 to 2010. Similarly, in Europe, HFT increased form only 
9% of equity trading in 2007 to 38% in 2010: Regulatory Issues (2011) above n 3, 23. 
26 Though detection rates are not unimportant, the number of people who commit 
market abuse which goes undetected is simply unknowable. 
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enforcement has followed successful detection), there are clearly strong 
incentives for individuals to engage in abuse. This is especially so ahead of a 
proposed takeover bid, where studies in the UK have routinely revealed 
abnormally high pre-announcement price movements (APPMs).27 
Similarly, in a recent US study by Beny and Seyhun, pre-takeover 
announcement spikes in stock prices were found to be 50% higher between 
2006-2011 than in the pre-2006 period studied.28 In research cited by the 
European Commission, involving an analysis of insider trading across ten 
international markets, it was estimated that insider dealing profits account 
for between 0.01 and 0.05% of total market turnover.29 Furthermore, the 
European Commission estimates that profit gained from insider dealing in 
the EU’s three largest exchanges – Euronext, Deutche Börse, and the LSE 
Group – expressed as a percentage of market turnover was 0.0356% in the 
period 2003-2009 and 0.0357% in 2009.30  
In relation to other abusive practices, again reliable indications of the 
prevalence of abuse are unavailable. According to IOSCO’s recent study 
identifying HFT as a particular area of concern, although no “clear evidence 
of the systematic and widespread use of abusive practices by those engaging 
                                                          
27 In the UK, see the FSA, “Market Cleanliness” surveys, regularly referenced in FSA 
Annual Reports. The surveys focus only on insider dealing and not other forms of abuse.  
28 L Beny and N Seyhun “Has Illegal Insider Trading Become More Rampant in the 
United States? Empirical Evidence from Takeovers” in S Bainbridge (ed) Research 
Handbook on Insider Trading (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2013) 211, 000. 
29 Capital Markets CRC Limited, Enumerating the Cost of Insider Trading (unpublished, 
2010) 8, cited in European Commission, Staff Working Paper Impact Assessment SEC(2011) 
1217 final) 16 (hereinafter, Commission, Impact Assessment). See also, C Comerton-
Forde and T Putnins, The prevalence and underpinnings of closing price manipulation, 
(manuscript at 3) (April 28, 2010), available at SSRN: http://ssm.com/abstract-
1243042 (suggesting that manipulation is a serious issue for exchanges); and, A Khwaja 
and A Mian, “Unchecked Intermediaries: Price Manipulation in an Emerging Stock 
Market” (2005) 78 J Fin Econ 203 (suggesting that “pump and dump” practices by 
institutional broker-dealers are particularly prevalent in developing countries). 
30 Commission, Impact Assessment, ibid., 200. 
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in HFT” was found, the report nevertheless recognised that “the submission 
of large numbers of orders and trades across multiple venues” poses 
significant challenges for national authorities.31 Moreover, a growing 
number of recent cases in both the US and the UK involving manipulative 
conduct associated with HFT, is suggestive of an emerging problem.32  
According to the European Commission, since the cost of market 
manipulation is likely to be of the same order of magnitude as insider 
dealing, it has been suggested that market abuse amounts to a combined 
cost of 0.0712% of market turnover.33 Extrapolating this to the European 
equity market in 2010, the Commission claims that the total value of 
market abuse (ie insider dealing and market manipulation) in terms of 
market turnover, was in the region of EUR 13.3 billion – a figure which 
the Commission considers to be an underestimate of the total cost of abuse 
on all EU markets, since it is based only on an assessment of equity 
markets.34 
                                                          
31 IOSCO, Regulatory Issues (2011), above n 3, 30. Moreover, as IOSCO recognises, in 
view of the growth in and relatively low level of scrutinty over OTC activity, these 
markets may “provide the ideal test markets for the development and refining of 
manipulative practices”: IOSCO, Addendum, (2013) above n 7, 2. 
32 In re Bunge Global Markets, Inc 
(http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legal
pleading/enfbungeorder032211.pdf);  SEC v Hold Brothers Online 
(http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2012/34-67924.pdf); and In the Matter of 
Panther Energy Trading LLC and  Michael  J Coscia (CFTC  Docket  No 13–26) (22 July, 
2013) http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/pantherorder072213.pdf; 
7722656 Canada Inc & Anor v The Financial Conduct Authority & Ors [2013] EWCA Civ 
1662.; and FCA, “FCA fines US based oil trader US $903K for market manipulation” 
(July, 2013) 
(http://www.fca.org.uk/news/fca-fines-us-based-oil-trader). 
33 Commission, Impact Assessment, above n 29, 200 (and studies cited therein). 
34 Interestingly, other studies reveal that irrespective of the real level of market abuse, 
market players perceive market abuse to be a widespread problem. For example, in the 
CFA’s Global Market Sentiment Survey: 2014, survey participants identified market fraud 
(which the survey associated with conduct such as insider dealing) as the second most 
  
11 | P a g e  
 
 
III. A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE RATIONALES 
FOR REGULATING MARKET ABUSE 
 
Market Manipulation 
Although attempts to justify prohibitions on market manipulation – or, at 
least, certain species of it – have not gone unchallenged,35 in general legal 
controls directed at market manipulation have provoked less heated debate 
than attempts to justify prohibitions on insider dealing.36 It is widely 
asserted, for example, that market manipulation amounts to an 
“unwarranted” interference in the operation of ordinary market forces of 
supply and demand which undermines the “integrity” and efficiency of the 
market. 37 Not surprisingly defining what amounts to “unwarranted” 
conduct is not without difficulty. It is, of course, widely accepted that 
deliberately making false statements in order to “move” the market is 
objectionable, since fraud infringes notions of perfect, or competitive, 
markets – and, thus, is said to represent an impediment to market 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
serious issue facing their local markets, and the most serious ethical issue facing global 
markets. 
<http://www.cfainstitute.org/about/research/surveys/Documents/gmss_2014_whit
epaper_print.pdf > 20. 
35 For claims that the law on market manipulation lacks conceptual and definitional 
clarity, see: Fischel and Ross, above n 12. The authors argue that there exists no 
objective definition of manipulation and that in so far as manipulation is objective it can 
be dealt with by the law against fraudulent conduct independently of any need to define 
it in securities law. 
36 In fact criticism has focused on deficiencies in the formulation or legal rules. See, eg, 
Donald, above n 11, 58–60. 
37 See, for example, IOSCO,  Investigating and Prosecuting Market Manipulation (May, 
2000) (price should be “set by the unimpeded collective judgment of buyers and 
sellers”) 8; North v Marra Developments Ltd [1982] 56 AJLR 106, NSW CA (noting the 
importance of markets which reflect “the forces of genuine supply and demand” (per 
Mason J)); and N Moloney, EC Securities Regulation (2nd edn, 2008, OUP) 931 and 
sources cited therein. 
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optimality.38 However, there is a risk that in seeking to prohibit market 
manipulation, legal rules that are broadly or vaguely framed will impede 
otherwise legitimate activities which promote price discovery and increase 
aggregate wealth. Similarly, definitional problems associated with 
“artificial” transactions and the “misuse” of market power, raise the spectre 
of regulatory over-reach and risk discouraging market innovations – again 
with adverse effects on wealth creation.  
At first glance, characterising market manipulations as incidents of “market 
failure” provides an elegant framework within which to justify regulatory 
intervention so as to restore market equilibrium. However, on closer 
inspection, market failure analysis merely serves to camouflage what is 
ultimately at stake: the determination of which informational advantages 
are legitimate in the context of market exchanges. As will be explored 
more fully below in relation to the empirical debate over the merits or 
otherwise of insider dealing, this is a problem which is not capable of being 
resolved by way of an appeal to market efficiency, or by the use – as some 
have suggested – of a cost-benefit analysis as means of determining where 
to draw the line.39   
Insider Dealing 
In contrast to the more muted critiques of regulatory prohibitions on 
market manipulation, the debate regarding the merits or otherwise of 
insider dealing has generated a voluminous academic literature,40 much of 
                                                          
38 R Clark, Corporate Law (Little, Brown, 1986) 151. 
39 For example, as Clark claims, where to draw the line depends ultimately “on an 
assessment of the costs and benefits.” Ibid, 000. 
40 Henry Manne’s 1966 book, Insider Trading on the Stock Market, (Free Press, New York, 
1966), hereinafter “ITSM”, remains, however, the locus classicus.   
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it sceptical of the “narratives” advanced in support of regulation,41 and 
some – such as Carlton and Fischel’s influential 1983 Stanford Law Review 
article – even suggesting that that the desirability of regulating the practice 
is, ultimately, an “empirical question”.42  
Justifications typically articulated to support such controls range from 
claims that insider dealing jeopardizes the development of fair and orderly 
markets, and, in so doing, undermines investor confidence;43 that it is 
immoral,44 and contrary to “good business ethics”;45 that it hurts 
corporations (and their shareholders),46 as well as investors generally47 and 
market-makers in particular;48 and that it impairs the allocative efficiency 
of the financial markets,49 by distorting managerial incentives with regard 
to disclosing information,50 reducing market liquidity,51 and increasing the 
cost of capital.52   
                                                          
41 J Benjamin, “The Narratives of Financial Law” (2010) 30 OJLS 787, 809.  
42 W D Carlton and D R Fischel, “The Regulation of Insider Dealing” (1983) 35 Stanford 
Law Review 857, 866 and 873. See also, F Easterbrook, “Insider Trading, Secret Agents, 
Evidentiary Privileges, and the Production of Information” [1981] Supreme Court Review 
309, fn 120 (“[a]lthough I think it likely that legal restrictions on [insider] trading are 
beneficial, the questions ultimately are empirical”). 
43 Directive 2003/6/EC (hereinafter “MAD), Recital 2. 
44 See, K L Scheppele, “‘It’s Just Not Right’:  The Ethics of Insider Trading” (1993) 56 Law 
and Contemporary Problems 123; W Allen, “Professor Scheppele’s Middle Way:  On 
Minimizing Normativity and Economics in Securities Laws” (1993) 56 Law and 
Contemporary Problems 175;  and R Schotland “Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, 
Insider Trading and the Stock Market” (1967) 53 Virginia Law Review 1425, 1438–1439. 
45 See, eg, Justice, Report on Insider Trading (London, 1972) para 3. 
46 See, eg, R J Haft, “The Effect of Insider Trading Rules on the Internal Efficiency of the 
Large Corporation” (1982) 80 Michigan Law Review 1051, 1051–1064.  
47 See, eg, W Wang, “Trading on Material Non-public Information on Impersonal 
Markets:  Who is Harmed and Who can Sue Whom under SEC Rule 10b-5?” (1981) 54 
Southern California Law Rev 1217, 1234–235. 
48 See, C A E Goodhart, “The Economics of ‘Big Bang’” (1987) Summer Midland Bank 
Review 6, 10. 
49 See generally, M Klock, “Mainstream Economics and the Case for Prohibiting Inside 
Trading” (1994) 10 Georgia State University Law Review 297. 
50 See, Schotland, above n 44, 1448–1449. 
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By contrast, those who oppose regulatory controls on insider dealing claim 
that the rationale, method, and scope of such regulation are misconceived. 
Specifically, it has been contended that inside information is a property 
right belonging to the firm, which the firm should be free to allocate as it 
sees fit;53 that insider dealing is an effective means of compensating 
entrepreneurs and managers;54 that, rather than hindering accurate price 
formation, insider dealing actually helps to promote it55 – by providing a 
less costly means of channelling information about securities into financial 
markets,56 and by helping to smooth out undesirable market fluctuations.57 
In doing so, insider dealing is said to help improve the efficiency of 
markets, both informationally and, by extension, allocatively.58 What is 
more, it has also been claimed that neither corporations (or their 
shareholders),59 nor investors generally,60 or market makers in particular,61 
are hurt by the use of inside information; and, finally, it has even been 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
51 See, Klock, above n 49, 330. 
52 See, M Mendelson, “Book Review:  The Economics Board of Insider Trading 
Reconsidered ” (1969) 117 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 470, 477–478;  and V 
Brudney, “Insider, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under Federal Securities 
Laws” (1979) 93 Harvard Law Review 322, 355–356. 
53 See generally, J Macey, Insider Trading:  Economic, Politics, and Policy (AIE Press, 
Washington DC, 1991). 
54 See, Carlton and Fischel, above n 42, 866–872;  Macey, above n 53, 000. 
55 See, Carlton and Fischel, ibid., 866-868. 
56 Ibid., 868. 
57 H Manne, “Insider Trading and the Law Professors” (1970) 23 Vanderbilt Law Review 
547, 574–575. 
 58 Manne, above n 40, 101–102. 
59 See, Schein v Chasen 313 So 2d 739 (Fla1975). 
60 J D Cox, “An Outsider’s Perspective of Insider Trading Regulation In Australia” (1990) 
12 Sydney Law Journal 455, 457–8. 
61 See, M King and A Roell, “Insider Trading” (1988) April Economic Policy 163, 168 et seq. 
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suggested that regulating insider dealing is misconceived, since it cannot be 
effectively enforced.62   
Interestingly, there are signs of a shift in the terms of the academic debate 
surrounding the merits of regulating insider dealing, spurred on, it would 
seem, by a quest for “hard facts”. A review of the recent literature reveals 
that scholars have begun to move away from earlier exchanges rooted in 
clashes between competing theoretical viewpoints, towards a newer debate 
which today focuses on an empirical analysis of the effects of regulation and 
its enforcement.63 Although this empirical debate has taken some time to 
get going,64 and aspects of it suffer from recognised methodological 
weaknesses,65 a body of empirical work has nevertheless begun to emerge 
that is broadly supportive of legal prohibitions on insider dealing on 
efficiency grounds.  
Thus, for example, studies show that countries in which insider dealing is 
more prevalent have more volatile stock markets;66 that the cost of a 
country’s capital decreases significantly after its first insider dealing 
                                                          
62 See, H Manne, “Insider Trading and Property Rights in New Information” (1985) 4 Cato 
Journal 933, 937. 
63 To some extent these developments are part of a burgeoning empirical law and 
finance literature (sparked by the pioneering work of R La Porta, F Lopez-de-Silanes, A 
Shleifer and R Vishny – see, eg, “Legal Determinants of External Finance” (1997) 52 J 
Fin 1131).  
64 L Beny, “Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World: An Empirical 
Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Debate” (2007) 32 J Corp L 237, 
239.  
65 For a good review of these weaknesses, see, L Hughes, “Impact of Insider Trading 
Regulations on Stock Market Efficiency: A Critique of the Law and Economics Debate 
and a Cross-Country Comparison” (2009) 23(2) Temple International & Comparative Law 
Journal, 479–510.  
66 J Du and S Wei, “Does Insider Trading Raise Market Volatility?” (2004) 114 Econ J 
916, 940. 
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prosecution,67 and that analyst following increases after a country’s initial 
enforcement of its insider dealing laws.68 Studies also suggest that bid-ask 
spreads widen where market-makers are exposed to better informed 
traders;69 and that stock prices reflect more firm specific information in 
jurisdictions with more stringent insider trading laws.70 Finally, in Beny’s 
influential 2007 comparative survey, “Insider Trading Laws and Stock 
Markets Around the World”, the author finds that those countries with 
“more stringent insider trading laws are generally associated with more 
dispersed equity ownership, greater stock price accuracy and greater stock 
market liquidity.”71  
In an age where our ability to measure and test claims is better than ever 
before, an appeal to empiricism to resolve a previously inconclusive 
academic debate is, unsurprisingly, attractive.72 Yet while the 
reconfiguration of the debate in empirical terms is undoubtedly of interest, 
such an inquiry is unlikely to shed much light on the important question of 
what our legal rules ought to be.73 This is not because of a lack of reliable 
                                                          
67 U Bhattacharya and H Daouk, “The World Price of Insider Trading” (2002) 57 J Fin 
75, 79 (2002).  
68 R Bushman, J Piotroski, and A Smith, “Insider Trading Restrictions and Analysts’ 
Incentives to Follow Firms” (2005) 60 J Fin 35. 
69 L Glosten and L Harris, “Estimating the Components of the Bid/Ask Spread” (1988) 
21 J Fin Econ 123, 140–141. 
70 N Fernandes and M Ferreira, “Insider Trading Laws and Stock Price Informativeness”, 
(2009) 22 Rev Fin Stud 1845, 1880–1881. 
71 L Beny, above n  64. However, cf Beny, “Do Shareholders Value Insider Trading 
Laws? International Evidence” (August 2006)  
(http://deepblue.lib.umich.edu/bitstream/handle/2027.42/57217/wp837%20.pdf?s
equence=1) 11 (claiming that more stringent insider trading laws are associated with 
higher corporate valuation in common law countries, but lower corporate valuation in 
civil law countries).   
72 See Carlton & Fischel, above n 41, 866. 
73 See, eg, J Rachlinski, “Evidence-Based Law” (2011) 96 Cornell L Rev 901, 918; and 
Shai Woznert, “Evidence-Based Law by Jeffrey J Rachlinski”  (2011) 96 Cornell L Rev 
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data, problematic though this is; but rather because the “market tools” used 
to conduct this empirical analysis – and the conclusions derived from this 
body of work – rest on a priori assumptions about the nature of markets 
which are, themselves, not capable of being resolved by empirical analysis.  
Thus, for example, standard neoclassical accounts of the operation of the 
market mechanism stipulate that for markets to deliver optimal societal 
outcomes, no informational asymmetries should exist – that is to say, 
conditions must exist which enable each party to make rational decisions 
based on “full” or “perfect” information. Where such conditions do not 
hold, there is said to exist a market failure which provides a prima facie 
justification for state intervention to remedy the failure. In relation to 
informational asymmetries, determining where the exact boundaries of any 
given market failure lies, tends either to be glossed over, or regarded as 
self-evident. Yet to suppose that the debate about whether a particular 
informational advantage should or should not be used in a given set of 
market transactions is, in fact, capable of being resolved by the use of 
studies testing the efficiency or otherwise of that market is misconceived, 
since the underlying problem can only be addressed by an appeal to non-
market values which are themselves beyond the realm of empirical 
observation. As Justice Allen informs us, although “[e]mpiricism is of great 
instrumental utility in the law, as a way of informing us how best to 
achieve some noncontroversial value .... disputes of ultimate value cannot 
be resolved by empirical investigations.”74 Carlton and Fischel’s claim, 
noted above, that the “desirability of regulating insider trading is ultimately 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
925. However, such considerations have not prevented commentators from continuing 
to couch debate in these terms: see, eg, Hughes, above 65, 484. 
74 Allen, above n 44, 183, fn 22.  
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an empirical question”75 is therefore misguided, and Beny’s enthusiastic 
appeal for “more empirical work … to conclusively resolve the theoretical 
debate”76 little more than a chimera. 
 
IV.   THE EVOLVING REGULATORY LANDSCAPE 
 
Notwithstanding the contested nature of the various rationales offered in 
support of prohibitions on insider dealing (and to a lesser extent market 
manipulation), there nevertheless exists a widespread global consensus 
about the need for measures outlawing such conduct.77 In this respect, 
developments within the EU offer an excellent vantage point from which 
to survey the evolving regulatory landscape – both general, and in terms of 
the regulatory response to recent market integrity concerns prompted by 
allegation of abusive short selling in the aftermath of the financial crisis, 
benchmark manipulation, the growing lack of transparency associated with 
the fragmentation of markets and trading platforms, and the heightened 
scope for abusive practices associated with the increasing use of HFT 
strategies. What is more, the EU regime also provides an interesting and 
increasingly important counterpoint to the US approach to insider dealing 
in particular. 
The EU Market Abuse Regime 
Unlike the US regime – the broad contours of which are outlined below – 
the EU regime on insider dealing rejects any need for a showing of fraud or 
                                                          
75 Above  n 42, 866.  
76 Benny, above n 71, 241. 
77 In a study of conducted by Bhattacharya and Daouk, as of the end of 1998 of the 103 
countries that had stock markets, 87 had laws prohibiting insider dealing: Bhattacharya 
and Daouk, above n 67, 75. 
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deception based on a breach of fiduciary duty (or other similar relationship 
of trust and confidence). Instead, the EU regime – in keeping with a global 
trend of which it might claim to be an exemplar – is predicated on an 
underlying policy of regulating market relationships by prohibiting persons 
from trading on the basis of non-publically available information.78 The 
regime is given legal expression by way of the Market Abuse Directive 
(MAD)79 – a key directive in a broader phalanx of measures designed to 
promote the development of a pan EU capital market – which embodies 
“bright line” minimum legislative standards, duly implemented in each EU 
Member State. 
In essence, the EU’s market abuse regime, which prohibits both insider 
dealing and market manipulation (collectively, known as “market abuse”), 
is characterised by complex statutory rules which marry technical 
proscriptions with detailed statutory exemptions,80 defences, and safe 
harbours.81 Accordingly MAD specifies the key ingredients of each market 
abuse offence. Thus, in relation to insider dealing, it specifies: the 
categories of person covered (eg primary and secondary insiders);82 the 
nature of the conduct proscribed (eg dealing, disclosing, and 
                                                          
78 MAD is designed to support the integrity of financial markets by helping to promote 
public confidence in, and the smooth function of, those markets: Recital 2. 
79 The European Union’s market abuse regime is currently comprised of  (a) a 
framework directive called the Market Abuse Directive (MAD) (Directive 
2003/6/2003; and (b) three European Commission directives: (i) the Market 
Manipulation Definitions Directive (Commission Directive 2003/124/2003); (ii) the 
MAD Implementing Directive (Commission Directive 2003/125/2003; and (iii) the 
Market Practices and Disclosure Directive (Commission Directive 2004/72/2003); as 
well as a Commission Regulation called the MAD Implementing Regulation 
(Commission Regulation 2273/2003). 
80 MAD, Art 7. 
81 MAD, Art 8, on stablisation and buy-backs. 
82 MAD, Arts 2 and 4. 
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recommending);83 the type of securities caught (eg equities, debt, 
derivatives etc);84 the range of public markets to which the prohibition 
extends (“regulated markets”);85 the nature of the information on which 
dealing etc is prohibited (“inside information”);86 and the regime’s 
jurisdictional reach.87 
The EU’s market abuse regime (unlike the position in the US) also 
embodies a commitment to the continuous disclosure of material 
information which is designed to promote the timely disclosure of material 
information, and thus limit the scope for insider dealing ex ante. The 
regime further comprises the use of “insider lists” (and insider reporting of 
certain personal transaction), as well as the reporting of suspicious 
transactions. Although MAD is non-prescriptive with regard to the type of 
sanctions required, as discussed below, a key feature of forthcoming EU 
reforms is the introduction of a more uniform and muscular approach to 
the use of sanctions and, indeed, to enforcement issues generally.  
As an ambitious and mutli-faceted regime with a broad compass, MAD 
represents a marked improvement on earlier harmonisation efforts in the 
area, and can fairly be regarded as a qualified success. Nevertheless, the 
regime has also had to face a number of significant challenges. For 
example, events associated with, and in the aftermath of, the recent 
                                                          
83 MAD, Arts, 2 and 3.  
84 These include “transferrable securities” as widely defined by, Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive (MiFID) Directive 2004/39/EC: Art 4(1)(18). 
85 See, MiFID Art 4(1)(14). Although a trading market may elect not to be a “regulated 
market”, as a mimum standards directive, Members States may enact laws which go 
above and beyond the EU minimum – ie “gold plate”. The EU regime also extends 
beyond regulated markets, encompassing trades on other markets where there is a 
causal connection with the operation of a regulated market.     
86 MAD, Art 1.  
87 MAD, Art 10. 
  
21 | P a g e  
 
financial crisis (namely, abusive short selling and benchmark manipulation), 
and the growing spectre of abuse associated with the growth of HFT 
strategies, have sorely tested the credibility of the regime and brought into 
sharper focus its ability to respond effectively to an ever expanding range of 
market integrity concerns. Accompanying these recent challenges are more 
long-standing problems associated with the lack of transparency resulting 
from the increasing fragmentation of trading venues in the wake of MiFID, 
and the more general lack of a coordinated pan European approach to the 
use of sanctions and enforcement in relation to breaches of the regime.  
The EU’s response to these challenges has been nuanced and multi-layered, 
involving a combination of: targeted measures, “soft law” guidelines, and 
amendments to associated Directives; as well as the outright overhaul of 
the market abuse regime itself. Thus, in relation to allegations of “abusive” 
short selling in the aftermath of the crisis, while it was generally accepted 
that such conduct would, in principle, amount to market abuse under 
MAD, it was nevertheless felt that more general concerns surrounding 
short selling were better dealt with by way of a targeted measure (the 
“Short Selling Regulation”) rooted in disclosure and improved market 
transparency.  
In relation to the spectre of abuse associated with the use of certain HFT 
strategies, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) – the 
EU’s sectoral regulator responsible for securities markets – has issued “soft 
law” guidelines.88 These guidelines aim to ensure that regulated markets 
and multi-lateral trading platforms (MTFs) have in place arrangements 
which enable them to identify conduct amounting to market abuse in an 
                                                          
88 Above n 24. 
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automated trading environment,89 and that investment firms which engage 
in algorithmic trading (with which HFT is strongly associated) have 
organisational arrangements in place to “to minimise the risk that their 
automated trading activity gives rise to market abuse (in particular market 
manipulation)”.90 ESMA’s soft law guidelines are in turn supplemented by 
amendments to the MiFID framework by way of a revised MiFID Directive 
(MiFID II)91 and a new Regulation (MiFIR)92 which place a number of 
restrictions on algorithmic trading, such as specific organisational 
requirements for firms engaging in algorithmic trading (and, more 
pertinently, in respect of market making algorithms) as well as measures 
targeted specifically at HFT participants, including fee structures for 
excessive order cancellation and minimum tick sizes.93    
As far as the overhaul and upgrade of MAD itself is concerned, the 
Commission has chosen two legal mechanisms: a Regulation (the Market 
Abuse Regulation (MAR)), which is directly applicable in each Member 
State, designed to reduce regulatory complexity and to promote great legal 
certainty; and a new Directive (Directive on criminal sanctions for insider 
dealing an market manipulation (CS-MAD))94, which requires the creation 
of criminal offences for serious forms of market abuse. Although recent 
events associated with concerns about short selling, benchmark 
manipulation, and the growth of HFT strategies, have added momentum to 
the reform of MAD, the rationale for the new regime is, in fact, rather 
more long standing. For reasons of space, I focus only on two key areas 
                                                          
89 Ibid., Guideline 5. 
90 Ibid., Guideline 6. 
91 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=PE%2023%202014%20INIT. 
92 http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=PE%2022%202014%20INIT 
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which, while broad brush, nevertheless offer a sense of the “general 
direction of travel” and resonate with at least some of the broader them 
themes touched on earlier – principally the willingness of modern 
securities regulators to flex their regulatory muscles by expanding the 
scope of the regimes they regulate, and their increasing willingness to 
resort to use of criminal sanctions to police those regimes. The two areas I 
focus on in this respect are: (i) efforts to remedy perceived gaps in the 
scope of the existing EU regime; and (ii) efforts to remedy perceived 
enforcement deficiencies in that regime.  
(i) Remedying Perceived Gaps in MAD 
Notwithstanding the broad scope of the EU’s existing market abuse 
regime, in the light of both market and regulatory developments a number 
of gaps in the regime have been identified, which MAR seeks to address. 
Currently MAD only prohibits market abuse in relation to financial 
instruments which are admitted to trading on a regulated market, whereas 
following the reforms introduced by MiFID, increasingly financial 
instruments are being traded on multilateral trading facilities (MTFs), on 
organised trading facilities (OTFs), or on over the counter (OTC) markets. 
Accordingly, MAR seeks to broaden the scope of the EU’s regime by 
including any financial instrument traded on an MTF (or admitted to 
trading on such a platform, or for which a request for admission to trade on 
a MTF has been made), or an instrument traded on an OTF, as well as any 
related financial instruments traded OTC (such as credit default swaps 
(CDS)) which can have an effect on the covered underlying market. In this 
way, MAR is designed to bring the definition of financial instruments used 
in the context of market abuse into line with that used in MiFID and thus 
remedy a widely acknowledged mismatch between the two regimes. 
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MAR also seeks to widen the scope of the existing regime by a series of 
other reforms, namely: 
• extending the definition of inside information for commodity 
derivatives to encompass all  information of a precise nature which is 
likely to have a significant effect on the price of, and is relevant to, 
either the related spot commodity contract or the derivative itself  
(and where this is information which is reasonably expected to be 
disclosed or required to be disclosed in accordance with relevant 
legal or regulatory provisions);95 
• extending the definition of market manipulation to encompass “cross 
market manipulations” – for example, transactions in derivatives 
markets designed to manipulate the price of related spot markets 
and vice-versa;96 
• classifying emission allowances as financial instruments and inserting 
a specific definition of inside information in relation to such 
instruments;97   
• expanding the scope of market manipulation to cover activities 
associated with benchmarks (such as LIBOR and EURIBOR);98 
• providing an indicative list of practices associated with algorithmic 
trading and HFT strategies which will be regarded as species of 
market manipulation;99  
                                                          
95 MAR, Art 7. 
96 MAR, Art 12. 
97 MAR, Art 2. 
98 MAR, Art 2. 
99 MAR, Art 12, Annex I. 
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• introducing specific offences of attempted insider dealing and 
attempted market manipulation;100 and  
• extending the current obligation to report suspicious transactions to 
the reporting of suspicious unexecuted order and suspicious OTC 
transactions.101 
These reforms a reveal a commitment by the EU to review and 
reform the contours of its market abuse regime in the light of 
developments in market infrastructure []  
(ii) Remedying Enforcement Problems: 
As well as seeking to remedy gaps in the MAD regime, the Commission’s 
reforms also aim to remedy acknowledged weaknesses in the way in which 
the regime is enforced. Under MAD, Member States have adopted a 
variegated approach to sanctions which has undermined the development 
of a fully integrated market.102 The aim of the new reforms, therefore, is to 
introduce more uniform pan EU enforcement measures which will have 
greater deterrent effect. These measures combine the introduction of new 
investigative powers for national regulators (so as to help detect market 
abuse), and the introduction of a new system of sanctions. These sanctions 
comprise the use of new administrative penalties (set out in MAR), as well 
as the use of criminal measures (set out in the CS-MAD) designed to 
                                                          
100 MAR, Arts 14 and 15. 
101 MAR, Recital 46 and Art 16. 
102 Overall, the picture of Member States’ regimes is “weak and heterogeneous”. Report 
of the High Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU (February 2009)(the De Larosiere 
Report) para 84 
<http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/publication14527_en.pdf>. 
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demonstrate a degree of “social disapproval [which is] qualitatively 
different” from the use of administrative or compensatory measures.103 
In relation to administrative sanctions, MAR establishes that the maximum 
administrative fine should be three times the profits gained or losses 
avoided in so far as these are ascertainable.104 For natural and legal persons 
administrative penalties vary. For the offences of insider dealing and 
market manipulation, natural persons are subject to a fine of at least €5 
million (for legal persons this is at least €15 million (or 15% of the entity’s 
annual turnover)), and, for the remaining offences under MAR, fines 
ranging between €1 million and €500,000 depending on the exact nature 
of the offence (for a legal person this ranges between at least €2.5 million 
(or 2% of total annual turnover) and €1 million). Member States do, 
however, have a discretion to exceed these limits.  
When imposing sanctions, competent authorities are under an obligation to 
take account of any aggravating factors (such as the gravity of the offence 
committed), or any mitigating factors (such as an offender’s cooperation 
with an investigation).105 Where persons commit repeated breaches of the 
offences of insider dealing and market manipulation, competent authorities 
may prohibit any such persons from discharging or exercising managerial 
responsibilities in an investment firm.106  
In relation to criminal sanctions, since, in accordance with EU law, the 
approximation of criminal law is only possible by way of a directive, these 
                                                          
103 CS-MAD, Recital 6. 
104 MAR, Art 30. 
105 MAR, Art 31. 
106 MAR, Art 30. 
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are dealt with by way of CS-MAD.107 In short, this requires the creation of 
criminal offences for serious forms of market abuse. Thus, under CS-
MAD, Member States are required to treat serious cases of intentional 
insider dealing and market manipulation (as well conduct which amounts 
to inciting or aiding and abetting those offences), and attempted insider 
dealing and attempted market manipulation, as criminal offences. Legal 
entities must be rendered subject to sanctions, as well as any individuals 
directly responsible for the misconduct.108 Sanctions must be “effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive”.109 For individuals, the maximum sanction is 
at least four years’ imprisonment for market manipulation and insider 
dealing (and recommending or inducing another person to engage in 
insider dealing), and two years’ for the unlawful disclosure of inside 
information.110 For legal persons, sanctions can comprise criminal or non-
criminal sanctions.111 In relation to the latter, these may include fines and 
sanctions such as: exclusion from entitlement to public benefits or aid; 
temporary or permanent disqualification from carrying on commercial 
activities; judicial winding up; or temporary or permanent closure of 
establishments which have been used in the commission of the offence.112 
Again, Member States retain a discretion to adopt or maintain more 
stringent criminal law measures. 
                                                          
107 Under the Lisbon Treaty, the UK is not automatically bound by EU legislative 
proposals in relation to freedom, security, and justice matters. The UK has chosen not 
to opt into CS-MAD, albeit that it retains the right to do so. 
108 Legal entities will be liable for a criminal offence if it is committed for their benefit 
by a person holding a leading position in the firm: Art 7(1) CS-MAD. Moreover, 
companies may also be criminal liable for offences committed by junior employees for 
the company’s benefit where there has been a corporate failure (eg where there has 
been a lack of supervision and control over that person by senior management): Art 
7(2). 
109 CS-MAD, Art 6. 
110 CS-MAD, Art 6. 
111 CS-MAD, Art 8. 
112 CS-MAD, Art 8. 
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In sum, while there is much about the EU’s enforcement of it market abuse 
regime which is likely to remain problematic notwithstanding these 
reforms, this more muscular approach to enforcement is both timely and 
welcome – and to a large extent resonates with developments in a number 
of other jurisdictions, namely the US and the UK.      
The US Approach to Insider Dealing 
The EU approach discussed above – at least in relation to insider dealing – 
stands in stark contrast to the US’s long-standing regulatory approach. In 
what can be regarded as an increasingly anomalous position, US insider 
dealing laws remains wedded to what is essentially a ‘relationship based’ 
model emphasising the protection of fiduciary norms of trust and 
confidence between parties, the classic example of which is the corporate 
insider who misappropriates company property (inside information) for 
personal benefit at the expense of his or her company. Lacking in an over-
arching legislative definition, the origins of US law on insider dealing 
instead lie in the development of a somewhat ad hoc corpus of law derived 
from: (a) s 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 (a broad anti-fraud 
provision rendering it unlawful for any person to employ in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security “any manipulative or deceptive 
device or contrivance” in contravention of SEC rules); and (b) the now 
notorious Rule 10b-5 promulgated thereunder.113  
                                                          
113 Rule 10b-5, which was not adopted by the SEC until 1942, states that:  
“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means or 
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange, 
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to  defraud,  
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material  fact  
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under 
which they were made, not misleading, or  
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Accordingly, both SEC administrative rulings and judicial decisions have 
played a highly significant role in shaping many of the elements of what 
constitutes insider trading,114 in a manner “reminiscent of a common law 
approach.”115 Bereft of the more consciously drawn contours of other 
modern regimes – such as illustrated by the position in the EU – a view has 
long been expressed that US insider trading jurisprudence is beset by 
“considerable ambiguity”116 and “undermined by the absence of a 
definition”.117 Although at various times during the 1980s Congress 
considered legislative proposals for a statutory reformulation of the test for 
“insider trading”, the argument that a statutory definition could 
“unintentionally narrow the scope of the law by facilitating schemes to 
evade the law”118 has ultimately prevailed. 
The absence of a broad statutory definition does, admittedly, afford the US 
authorities some discretion over how to respond to insider dealing threats, 
and in many respects US law has proved itself capable of evolving to meet 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would 
operate as fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of 
any security.” 
114 For example, the meaning of “non-public inside information”, as well as the degree of 
scienter (mens rea) required to generate liability under section 10(b) and Rule l0b-5. 
115 E Greene and O Schmid, “Duty-Free Insider Trading?” [2013] Columbia Business Law 
Review 369, 372. 
116 H Pitt and K Shapiro, “The Insider Trading Proscriptions Act of 1987: A Legislative 
Initiative for a Sorely Needed Clarification of the Law Against Insider Trading” (1988) 
39 Ala L Rev 415, 417. 
117 L Ruiz, “European Community Directive on Insider Dealing: A Model for Effective 
Enforcement of Prohibitions on Insider Trading in International Securities Markets” 
(1995) 33 Colum J Transnat’l L. 217 . 
118 Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Act of 1988, HR Rep. No. 100-910, 100th 
Cong, 2d Sess, § 3 (1988). The Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1983, Hearings before 
the Subcommittee on Securities of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, 98th Cong, 2d Sess 37 (1984) (statement byJ Fedders, former SEC 
Enforcement Division Director).  
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market needs. In the aftermath of the SEC’s set-back in Chiarella,119 and, 
again, not long thereafter in Dirks,120 the general trajectory of US insider 
dealing law has been undeniably expansionary – achieved in part by way of 
the Supreme Court’s subsequent endorsement of the “misappropriation 
theory” in O’Hagan,121 and also by way of detailed SEC rule-making (often 
as a means of countering judicial rebuffs).122 Nevertheless, in being 
primarily tethered to its “breach of duty” moorings as the basis for a 
showing of deceptive conduct under s10b and Rule 10b-5, the 
development of US law has, arguably, been hindered by its weak 
foundations. These foundations have given rise to a jurisprudence which is 
deficient in terms of its conceptual underpinnings (focusing on an overly 
narrow breach of duty as the basis of deceptive conduct rather than a more 
broadly based concept involving the regulation of market relationships),123 
under-inclusive in terms of its scope (there have recently been a number of 
cases where the courts have declined to rule that conduct was in breach of 
                                                          
119 445 US 222 (1980). Here, the Supreme Court held that the duty to “disclose or 
abstain” – derived from its earlier ruling in Texas Gulf Sulphur 401 F 2d 833 (2d Cir 
1968)  – was dependent upon whether the defendant owed the issuer of the securities a 
fiduciary or other relationship of trust and confidence. The Supreme Court found that no 
such relationship existed. Accordingly, since no duty was owed to the issuer, the 
defendant was free to trade in the issuers securities on the basis of the material 
information he possessed.   
120 Dirks v SEC 463 US 646 (1983). 
121 United States v O’Hagan, 521 US 642, 653-54 (1997). The misappropriation theory 
holds that a person is prohibited from trading on the basis of information which has been 
misappropriated from its source, irrespective of whether the source of the information 
is a corporate (or temporary) insider of the issuer in whose securities trading has taken 
place. Accordingly, while no breach of fiduciary duty by a corporate (or temporary 
insider) is required to establish liability under the misappropriation theory, a fiduciary 
or similar duty of trust or confidence to the source of the information must nevertheless 
be established. 
122 For example, the SEC immediately followed its set-back in Chiarella, with the 
promulgation of Rule 14e-3, made pursuant to s 14 (e) SEA 34 (prohibiting insider 
dealing in the context of takeovers). The rule applies irrespective of whether the 
defendant owes or has breached a fiduciary or other duty to the relevant issuer.  
123  
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Rule 10b-5),124 and clumsy and erratic in terms of its ad hoc development 
(evident by virtue of an element of “ebb and flow” in legal developments).  
More generally, at a time when financial markets are more global and 
inter-connected than ever before, the US approach to the development of 
its corpus of its insider dealing law is increasingly out of step with other 
major financial centres, particularly in the UK and in continental Europe. 
Although the EU regime has much to learn from the US in terms of the 
latter’s long-standing commitment to active enforcement, it is suggested 
that the US could learn much from the more comprehensive and 
systematized “bright line” approach evident in the EU regime. Indeed, 
recent efforts to upgrade the EU’s market abuse regime, both in terms of 
its scope and by way of a more muscular approach to enforcement issues – 
in particular, by way of the endorsement of the use of criminal sanctions 
for serious market abuses – presages a new era for EU regulation of such 
conduct. More significantly, forthcoming reforms place the EU at the 
vanguard of the global charge to tackle market abuse, and, once 
implemented, mean that the EU regime can fairly lay claim to being the 
most comprehensive and sophisticated market abuse regime in the world. 
To some extent, the EU’s new approach to the use of criminal sanctions 
resonates with a global trend towards more intensive enforcement of 
market abuses and, more especially, the use in some quarters of criminal 
sanctions to deter insider dealing, as discussed below in Section V. 
                                                          
124 See, eg, J Coffee, “Introduction: Mapping the Future of Insider Trading Law: of 
Boundaries, Gaps, and Strategies” (2013) Colum Bus L Rev 281, 289–296 (discussing 
recent case law). See also, S Bainbridge, “An Overview of Insider Trading Law and 
Policy: An Introduction to The Insider Trading Research Handbook” in Bainbridge (ed) 
Research Handbook on Insider Trading (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2013) 1, 2 (the 
existing law is characterised by “a number of problems and curious gaps”). 
  
32 | P a g e  
 
 
V.         ENFORCEMENT TRENDS 
 
A notable feature of the insider dealing debate over the last 40 years or so, 
has been a disjuncture been the eagerness of countries to enact laws 
prohibiting insider dealing, and their subsequent unwillingness/inability to 
enforce those laws. Significantly, evidence is now emerging which suggests 
that this global picture is slowly beginning to change. According to Clark, 
from 2009 to the end of March 2010, a number of countries across five 
continents reported increased levels of insider trading enforcement: 
Australia, Canada, Italy, China, and Kenya.125 Furthermore, evidence of 
significant enforcement developments have also been reported in Hong 
Kong,126 Japan,127 Singapore,128 France,129 Germany,130 and the UK.131 And 
in a number of other jurisdictions, regulators have confirmed that the 
                                                          
125 See S Clark, “Insider Trading and Financial Economics: Where Do We Go From 
Here?” (2010–2011) 16 Stan J L Bus & Fin 43 and sources cited therein. See also, 
Madison Marriage, “Red alert over record year for insider dealing” Financial Times (5 
January, 2014) (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b426dc10-7461-11e3-9125-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qvY7edpj).  
126 See, K Wong, “Former Morgan Stanley Banker Du Jailed for 7 Years” Bloomberg (18 
September, 2009) (available at http//www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid--
newsarchive &sid=aZcWlQ2OIrfY ). 




129 In France, insider dealing fines more than doubled to €19m in 2013. Marriage, above 
n 123.  
130 In 2013, investigations into insider dealing increased from 26 to 42. Ibid. 
131 See below n ? and accompanying text. 
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enforcement of their insider dealing/market abuse laws represents a major 
priority going forward.132    
Not surprisingly, the US authorities (primarily, the SEC and the 
Department of Justice (DoJ)) remain at the forefront of efforts to enforce 
insider trading laws. According to a recent study by Beny and Seyhun, the 
authors found that while from 1980 through to the late 1990s, there was a 
steady, albeit rather modest year on year increase in the number of actions 
brought by the SEC for insider dealing, thereafter there was a “fundamental 
turning point” in the Agency’s enforcement intensity.133 Thus, between 
1980 and 1990, SEC actions almost doubled (from 20 to 38), and between 
2005-2010 (following a marked increase from 2000 onwards) they 
remained relatively steady, at an average of 49 actions per year.134 The 
authors also found signs of renewed enforcement intensity in 2010-2011, 
with the SEC reporting 57 insider dealing actions against 124 individuals 
and entities, an increase of nearly 8% in the number of actions filed by 
them from the previous fiscal year.135     
Although Beny and Seyhun adduce only anecdotal evidence to support their 
claim that there has also been an increase in the number of criminal 
convictions for insider dealing, they nevertheless show that where 
                                                          
132 See, for example, the Dutch Authority for Financial Markets, the Autoriteit 
Financiële Markten (AFM) (Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, European Market Abuse News 
(Spring 2012)); and, in Spain, the Securities Markets Commission (CNMV) (Freshfields 
Bruckhaus Deringer, Global Market Abuse News (Spring 2013)).  
133 L Beny and N Seyhun, above n 28, 000 (finding that between 1980 and 1990, actions 
almost doubled (to 38), and that between 2005–2010 they have remained relavtively 
steady, at an average of 49 actions per year). 
134 The number of SEC investigations into insider dealing has also recently increased in 
2013. Marriage, above n 123.  
135 In 2012, the SEC also settled 118 cases of insider dealing, significantly more that the 
previous 6 year average of 71: Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (2013), above n 130. 
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convictions have occurred, the severity of punishment has increased.136 
Between 1993 and 1999, fewer than 5% of defendants received custodial 
sentences of two years or more, whereas between 2000 and 2009 this had 
increased to more than 25%. Moreover, reflecting the type of renewed 
SEC enforcement intensity referred to above, in the last two years this has 
doubled, to around 50%.137 
To some extent echoing US developments, evidence of a renewed 
commitment to enforcing insider dealing and wider market abuse laws can 
also be found in the UK.138 Here a policy of “credible deterrence” – 
pioneered by the now defunct FSA, and today continued by the newly 
formed Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) – has been carried out with 
considerable vigour.139 As part of this policy, the UK regulator has proved 
willing to use the full array of enforcement tools at its disposal,140 including 
a willingness to bring criminal charges against individuals.141 Thus, having 
not commenced its first criminal prosecution for insider dealing until 2008, 
                                                          
136 Beny and Seyhun, above n 28, 000, (finding that the probability of serving a prison 
sentence as well as the length served significantly increased). 
137 Emblematic of US successes on this front is the recent high profile conviction of Raj 
Rajaratnam, a former hedge fund manager, who was sentenced to eleven years’ 
imprisonment and fined over $156 million. Furthermore, in March 2013, the SEC 
announced a record $602m settlement on insider dealing charges against the hedge fund 
advisory firm, CR Intrinsic Investors (CR), as well as a $14m settlement with its 
affiliate, SAC Capital Advisors.  
138 In the UK the criminal offence of insider dealing is governed by the Criminal Justice 
Act (Part V) 1993, whereas the civil/administrative offence of market abuse is governed 
by the Financial Services and Markets Act Part VIII.  
139 This policy was first introduced in its 2008/2009 Business Plan by Hector Sants (the 
then CEO of the FSA). 
140 In relation to market abuse under FSMA 2000, Part VIII, these encompass: public 
censure  (s 123(3)); the imposition of a fine ((s 123(2); and, on its own initiative, 
restitution against an authorised person (s 384). The FCA may also apply to the court for:  
(a) injunctions (s 381(1)); (b) remedial orders (s 381(2)); (c) freezing orders (s 381(3));  
and (d) restitutionary and compensatory orders (s 383).  
141 Unlike the SEC in the US, the FCA is vested with authority to prosecute breaches of 
the CJA (Part V) 1993: FSMA 2000, s 402(1)(a)). 
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the FSA had, by July 2013, secured 23 successful convictions.142 Recent 
figures confirm that this trend has not abated, with a further 7 criminal 
prosecutions pending. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that at the 
time of its demise, the FSA was both willing and able to investigate and 
prosecute more complex cases and that an increasing number of defendants 
were sufficiently cowered to plead guilty to insider dealing charges.143 To 
some extent, evidence of the UK’s recent focus on the use of criminal 
sanctions for breaches of its insider dealing laws also resonates with 
indications of a more muscular approach by the EU in relation to sanctions, 
as noted above. 
A number of factors are likely to underpin this global trend towards more 
active enforcement of insider dealing laws.144 First, since markets in which 
insider dealing is perceived to be rife are likely to be regarded as less 
attractive centres for cross-border trading, regulators have an incentive to 
enforcement laws in the hope of attracting more cross-border deals.  
Secondly, greater emphasis on enforcement may reflect a market’s 
evolving understanding of conduct which adversely affects market 
integrity. Thus a nation’s response to enforcing, say, insider dealing 
violations may, in fact, be emblematic of, and a useful proxy for, the 
maturity of its financial markets – if not always the quality of its regulatory 
regime overall. Thirdly, following IOSCO’s lead, scope for lead greater 
                                                          
142 http://www.fca.org.uk/news/firms/four-arrested-in-fca-insider-dealing-
investigation. 
143 Such as the successful conclusion of “Operation Saturn”, involving convictions against 
an insider dealing ring trading multiple stocks between 2006 and 2008. FSA, Annual 
Report 2012/13, 39. 
144 See H Pitt and D Hardison, “Games without Frontiers: Trends in the International 
Response to Insider Trading” (1992) 55 Law & Contemp Probs 199 (explaining a similar 
albeit less pronounced trend in the late 1980s and early 1990s – at least in relation to 
the enactment of insider dealing laws). 
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investigative assistance and mutual cooperation amongst foreign securities 
authorities is likely to enhance enforcement efforts.145 Thirdly, use of 
increasingly sophisticated surveillance techniques has increased regulators’ 
chances of detecting unusual trading patterns, and thus helped to increase 
the number of investigations and, subsequently, the number of 
enforcement actions they are able to bring.146  
A final and less benign reason for the observed increase in enforcement 
intensity might reside in the idea that some regulatory regard more 
vigorous enforcement of conduct such as insider dealing, as a relatively 
easy and high-profile way of re-asserting authority over both their financial 
markets and the “actors” they regulate. This is likely to be particularly so 
insofar as regulatory authorities have been the focus of sustained criticism 
in relation to their performance in the lead up to, and during, the financial 
crisis. Obvious candidates in this context are the regulatory authorities in 
both the US and the UK – two jurisdictions which are currently at the 
forefront of the enforcement charge.  
 
V.       CONCLUSION 
 
                                                          
145 IOSCO, Multilateral Memorandum Of Understanding: Concerning Consultation And 
Cooperationand The Exchange Of Information 
(http://www.bcsc.bc.ca/uploadedFiles/IOSCO_MMOU_2012.pdf). 
146 For example, for developments in the UK, see, R Sullivan “FSA unveils new market 
abuse detector” (7 August, 2011) (http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/76f6adee-bea5-11e0-
ab21-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2qvY7edpj) (detailing the introduction of Zen); and in 
Australia (M Drummond, “ASIC targets insider traders with new $44m surveillance 
system” Financial Review (24 Nov, 2013) 
(http://www.afr.com/p/business/sunday/asic_targets_insider_traders_with_Ubmm
HE8v9cFZaGDfir6QGO) (detailing the introduction of a new surveillance system called 
‘MAI’). 
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In the aftermath of the global financial crisis there has been renewed 
interest in, and more intense scrutiny of, activities which raise the spectre 
of market abuse and in turn prompt concerns about market integrity. Such 
evidence as exists, suggests that market abuse is a continuing problem in 
the context of modern financial markets and that it poses acute challenges 
for regulatory authorities. As both markets and trading strategies continue 
to evolve, new strains of market abuse have emerged and opportunities for 
abuse now exist on a scale not previously possible.  
Although market manipulation, and especially abusive conduct associated 
with HFT, is increasingly attracting the gaze of regulators, much academic 
and regulatory attention continues to focus on insider dealing – a practice 
long regarded as emblematic of our concerns about market integrity. In the 
space of only a handful of decades, insider dealing has gone from being a 
distinctly US preoccupation, to a practice which today attracts global 
opprobrium. In Europe, which, by virtue of MAD, has been the testing 
ground for pan EU measures prohibiting insider dealing and market 
manipulation – and for the deployment of continuous disclosure measures 
which seeks to prevent abuse ex ante – the regulatory landscape is both 
complex and evolving. Although long in the shadow of US efforts to 
promote market integrity, the MAD regime has enabled the EU to emerge 
as a global player in the fight against market abuse. What is more, 
forthcoming reforms which are set to widen the regime’s scope, combined 
with a more muscular approach to the enforcement of it, threaten to 
catapult the EU’s regime to the very forefront of global efforts to “keep 
markets clean”.   
Ultimately, however, assessing where the right balance is between 
permitting certain informational advantages and market practices and 
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outlawing others so as to support and promote market integrity, raises 
fundamental questions about the nature of those markets, and the 
conditions necessary for the claimed benefits of market optimality to 
materialise. Properly understood, financial markets represent socially 
constructed mechanisms which are designed to harness human energies 
(and allocate scare resources) for productive, collectively enriching, 
purposes. Accordingly, the decision to prohibit insider dealing, and market 
abuse more generally, turns on a determination of those conditions upon 
which private investment in the pursuit of private profit on public markets 
is rendered legitimate. And in order to do this, not only do we need to 
work out what sort of initiative we wish to encourage/discourage but, 
more broadly, what we value as a society. For these reasons, debates about 
market integrity – and insider dealing in particular – will, irrespective of 
the search for empirical resolution, forever remain fuzzy, messy and 
contestable.147 
                                                          
147 See, Allen, above n 44, 176, 182. 
